Underrated reasons vote margins are widening
Unintended (or maybe intended?) consequences of tweaking the Institution
Synodical decisions about women in office (henceforth: “Previous Thing”) in the 70s, 80s, and 90s passed by razor thin margins. For example, Synod 1994’s vote to undo Synod 1993’s decision on the Previous Thing was 52% to 48%, as I recall (I can’t find the source; I think it was noted somewhere in an overture to Synod 1995).
The margins surrounding the Current Thing are not close. Here are recent vote counts:
Synod 2022 recommend the HSR to churches by 131 to 45
Synod 2022 declared confessional status by 123 to 53
Synod 2023 rejected Neland’s appeal by 124 to 47
Had Synod 2023 voted on Committee Reports 8D and 8E, they probably would have passed by similar lopsided supermajorities.
(For reference, the 2016 vote approving the minority report of the committee on pastoral advice passed by 110 to 71—not the razor thin margins of the 1990s, but not nearly as wide as 2022 or 2022 margins.)
There are many reasons we’re not seeing the razor thin margins on the Current Thing like we did for the Previous Thing.
However, here are four that are particularly underrated:
Splitting Classis Cascades in 2019 added four votes for the traditional / non-affirming view. Though the stated reasons for the split were related to the size of Classis Pacific Northwest, the complication of meeting over a wide geographic area, and the inability to make connections in what was, at the time, the CRC’s largest classes, it’s hard not to read between the lines. The CRCs in Lynden, Washington are far more conservative, on average, than churches in Classis Pacific Northwest. I don’t think the main reason for the split was to add four conservative votes to future Synods—including the at-the-time impending HSR—but this was the outcome, and more than a few delegates must have known this.
There are fewer deacons. Last year’s Synod made delegating deacons optional. This makes it more likely for far-flung—often conservative—classes to send a full delegation. The delegate from Classis Minnkota (I think) made this exact point on the floor of synod last year. This will certainly add a few more conservative votes than we’ve seen the past few years.
COD delegates are nominated differently from BOT members. The change in 2018(ish) to the way people are appointed to what is essentially a Synodical Interim Committee. Previously, the board was organized geographically. Now, each classis is represented. In my view, this is a fairer system. And while the COD operates only at the will of synod, it can certainly affect the denomination at an institutional level. A slightly more conservative COD will produce a slightly more conservative denomination. There’s an overture this year asking synod to allow classes to appoint their own board members, which will hasten this drift. (Note: I’m not saying this is good or bad; I’m only saying this is the outcome these actions will produce.)
Easier paths to ordination have opened the denomination to ordaining more conservative ministers. Over the past few decades, and especially the past few years, we are ordaining ministers who did not attend Calvin Seminary. More ministers are coming from places like Westminster and RTS. Chad Werkhoven, for example, who is among the farther right-leaning delegates to Synod 2023 and Synod 2024, received his degree from Reformed Theological Seminary. As recently as a couple decades ago, his path to ordination in the CRC would have been more difficult.
Would the absence of these four factors have changed the vote? Absolutely not.
But they will contribute to the slow institutional drift to the right.
The wake-up call for the left is that these changes more accurately represent where most of the denomination really is.
(Note: I’m about 70% confident in everything written above. It’s a first draft. File this under speculative. Reply with your disagreements.)