The moderates have the most to lose
Churches at the extremes have one main thing in common.
Churches that are solidly traditionally and solidly affirming have a lot in common. Perhaps the thing they have most in common is they have internal consensus.
It’s common to put churches in the CRC on a left–right spectrum. We might, for example, put a few hundred churches who strongly hold to a traditional view of human sexuality on the right, and put a couple dozen who strongly hold to an affirming view on the left. All the moderate churches lie somewhere in between. Like this:
However, the actual spectrum is more like this
:
Who are the moderates?
My guess is about half of churches in the CRC are largely comprised of people whose spectrum of beliefs cluster around some version of these four views, loosely held:
Have a basically traditional view of human sexuality in line with the 1973 report
Have no objection to ordaining women in church office, though don’t feel strongly about it and don’t necessarily attend a church where women are ordained.
Can see the logic of Synod 2022’s definition of unchastity, but think it might be a bit of a reach.
Don’t really care about gravamina, probably haven’t thought about it much, and likely won’t like what Synod will probably decide
The moderates can be swayed. Paul De Vries convinced many of them to vote against what he called punitive measures against Neland, for example.
Moderate churches are more likely to be convinced by the right than the left
People who are uncertain are risk averse.
When someone in the middle who, perhaps, hasn’t spent a great deal of time thinking through issues—or has but still isn’t sure—hears appeals from both the right and the left, they’ll take the less risky side. Usually, that’s the default option. In this case, it’s the one the CRC has been clear about since 1973.
This image, for example, portends uncertainty. Zero moderates will be swayed by this.
Moderate churches don’t have strong internal consensus
Synod 2024 will probably prescribe a clear path forward for churches like Sherman Street and Trinity. It will consider overtures and take steps toward some outcome. Overtures will be read, advisory committees will do their work, speeches will be made on the floor of Synod, and votes will be taken. Not everyone will like the plan, but there will be a plan.
The churches without internal consensus will face the brunt of Synod’s decisions. Synod will likely not outline a plan for these churches.
We saw this last year when the council of Alger Park CRC voted to become affirming, but the congregation rejected the council’s decision. Similar versions of this scenario are playing out in informal ways among many other congregations. They may not be taking votes, but they’ve having congregational meetings, forming listening circles, and drafting statements. Some churches will have the tools to navigate, but many won’t. The next few years will be difficult for these churches.
It will be even worse for small churches, especially those barely big enough to support one full-time staff person (the pastor). There are 291 churches in the CRC with fewer than 100 members, and many would require the departure of just a few people to become non-viable. Some will not survive Synod 2024.
Stuck in the middle
For many moderates, matters of human sexuality aren’t their issues. They don’t want to make a hard stance on this issue, just like many don’t take hard stances on any number of the hundreds of other challenging issues of our time. If they have a firm conviction, it’s that the challenging issues of our moment ought to be worked out together within the walls of the church, not in isolation on social media.
These moderates will pay the price for the fight others in the denomination are having and the decisions Synod will make.
Thanks for reading,
Kent
I agree that churches are on a spectrum, and that those with less internal consensus are in the most difficult position. However, I do think that your starting point (20 on the left and 200 on the right) is way off, and part of the reason that the left fails to see why they are loosing on this issue.
I always hear about the middle, always hear about the moderates, and there is this idea that there are 20-30% on either poll, and the majority, the 40-60% moderates in the middle, that are actually in control. While that is probably accurate of the CRC in many areas (we are and will continue to be a moderate denomination), I think, on this issue those numbers are trash. Instead, my sense is there is closer to 15% on the left, 50% on the right, and 35% of the more moderate in the middle.
Just to give one example from Synod 2023, on the vote to send the second in-loco committee to Neland, it was not just the "moderates" that were swayed. I know of a delegate to Synod 2023, who had already removed council members from office over this issue in their local church, that voted with Paul to give Neland one more year to repent. Now, I have no idea how close that vote actually was or was not, but it wasn't just "moderates" being swayed to give Neland more time.
I think the second proof that these numbers are wrong is by examining our closest denominational cousin, the RCA. In 2014, at the Pella Accord, was the RCA more or less conservative than the CRC in general? How about specifically on the issue of SSM? Jumping forward a decade, over that time, more than 50% of the churches we entered into the Pella Accord with have now left that denomination, ostensibly over the issue of SSM. Remember, on paper, the RCA is right where we are with the HSR, but without confessional status. Yet 50%+ of the RCA is gone. If confessional status proved to carry no teeth, and there was no discipline in the CRC (which I think is extremely unlikely at this point), in stead of 20%/200 churches looking to leave the CRC, I think we would be looking at 50-60%/500-600 churches leaving the denomination in the next 3-5 years.
A1B, Hesed, and Better Together have not "lost" in the CRC because they have failed to convince enough of the moderates. They have lost on this issue, because there were not enough moderates to convince. There are not near as many moderates on SSM as were thought.
Thanks Kent. Love reading your thought process. I'd love to see your take on a left-right-moderate analysis from a different angle: since those terms are temporal, your article is properly framed as a single point in time (the 2024 Synod). Perhaps you could give the long view. In other words, how many years does it typically take for a liberal position to be embraced by conservatives? Examples in the Synod record include the woman's right to vote, evolution, hymns vs Psalms, English in services, etc. Is there a pattern for which liberal positions eventually get embraced and which stay permanently rejected? Does human sexuality fit either data?