I agree that churches are on a spectrum, and that those with less internal consensus are in the most difficult position. However, I do think that your starting point (20 on the left and 200 on the right) is way off, and part of the reason that the left fails to see why they are loosing on this issue.
I always hear about the middle, always hear about the moderates, and there is this idea that there are 20-30% on either poll, and the majority, the 40-60% moderates in the middle, that are actually in control. While that is probably accurate of the CRC in many areas (we are and will continue to be a moderate denomination), I think, on this issue those numbers are trash. Instead, my sense is there is closer to 15% on the left, 50% on the right, and 35% of the more moderate in the middle.
Just to give one example from Synod 2023, on the vote to send the second in-loco committee to Neland, it was not just the "moderates" that were swayed. I know of a delegate to Synod 2023, who had already removed council members from office over this issue in their local church, that voted with Paul to give Neland one more year to repent. Now, I have no idea how close that vote actually was or was not, but it wasn't just "moderates" being swayed to give Neland more time.
I think the second proof that these numbers are wrong is by examining our closest denominational cousin, the RCA. In 2014, at the Pella Accord, was the RCA more or less conservative than the CRC in general? How about specifically on the issue of SSM? Jumping forward a decade, over that time, more than 50% of the churches we entered into the Pella Accord with have now left that denomination, ostensibly over the issue of SSM. Remember, on paper, the RCA is right where we are with the HSR, but without confessional status. Yet 50%+ of the RCA is gone. If confessional status proved to carry no teeth, and there was no discipline in the CRC (which I think is extremely unlikely at this point), in stead of 20%/200 churches looking to leave the CRC, I think we would be looking at 50-60%/500-600 churches leaving the denomination in the next 3-5 years.
A1B, Hesed, and Better Together have not "lost" in the CRC because they have failed to convince enough of the moderates. They have lost on this issue, because there were not enough moderates to convince. There are not near as many moderates on SSM as were thought.
Thanks Kent. Love reading your thought process. I'd love to see your take on a left-right-moderate analysis from a different angle: since those terms are temporal, your article is properly framed as a single point in time (the 2024 Synod). Perhaps you could give the long view. In other words, how many years does it typically take for a liberal position to be embraced by conservatives? Examples in the Synod record include the woman's right to vote, evolution, hymns vs Psalms, English in services, etc. Is there a pattern for which liberal positions eventually get embraced and which stay permanently rejected? Does human sexuality fit either data?
I agree that churches are on a spectrum, and that those with less internal consensus are in the most difficult position. However, I do think that your starting point (20 on the left and 200 on the right) is way off, and part of the reason that the left fails to see why they are loosing on this issue.
I always hear about the middle, always hear about the moderates, and there is this idea that there are 20-30% on either poll, and the majority, the 40-60% moderates in the middle, that are actually in control. While that is probably accurate of the CRC in many areas (we are and will continue to be a moderate denomination), I think, on this issue those numbers are trash. Instead, my sense is there is closer to 15% on the left, 50% on the right, and 35% of the more moderate in the middle.
Just to give one example from Synod 2023, on the vote to send the second in-loco committee to Neland, it was not just the "moderates" that were swayed. I know of a delegate to Synod 2023, who had already removed council members from office over this issue in their local church, that voted with Paul to give Neland one more year to repent. Now, I have no idea how close that vote actually was or was not, but it wasn't just "moderates" being swayed to give Neland more time.
I think the second proof that these numbers are wrong is by examining our closest denominational cousin, the RCA. In 2014, at the Pella Accord, was the RCA more or less conservative than the CRC in general? How about specifically on the issue of SSM? Jumping forward a decade, over that time, more than 50% of the churches we entered into the Pella Accord with have now left that denomination, ostensibly over the issue of SSM. Remember, on paper, the RCA is right where we are with the HSR, but without confessional status. Yet 50%+ of the RCA is gone. If confessional status proved to carry no teeth, and there was no discipline in the CRC (which I think is extremely unlikely at this point), in stead of 20%/200 churches looking to leave the CRC, I think we would be looking at 50-60%/500-600 churches leaving the denomination in the next 3-5 years.
A1B, Hesed, and Better Together have not "lost" in the CRC because they have failed to convince enough of the moderates. They have lost on this issue, because there were not enough moderates to convince. There are not near as many moderates on SSM as were thought.
Thanks Kent. Love reading your thought process. I'd love to see your take on a left-right-moderate analysis from a different angle: since those terms are temporal, your article is properly framed as a single point in time (the 2024 Synod). Perhaps you could give the long view. In other words, how many years does it typically take for a liberal position to be embraced by conservatives? Examples in the Synod record include the woman's right to vote, evolution, hymns vs Psalms, English in services, etc. Is there a pattern for which liberal positions eventually get embraced and which stay permanently rejected? Does human sexuality fit either data?